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ABSTRACT 
During the past three decades, many firms in developing market have embarked retrenchment 
strategy in order to defend firm going concern from economy turbulence. Yet, this strategy is 
rarely investigated compared to another strategy like diversification.  This is not to mention 
limited research investigating whether companies might manipulate their earnings through the 
retrenchment costs across ownership expropriation. As Malaysia offers unique background 
earnings management, corporate strategy and ownership structure, this study aims to answer 
intriguing yet interesting question: Do Malaysia’s listed companies consider retrenchment costs 
when they manipulate earning across its ownership expropriation? Using 237 Malaysian listed 
companies over the period 2008-2013, this study found that retrenchment costs are used to 
manipulate earnings in companies. In addition, we find that ownership concentration do not 
significantly affects the earnings management of the firms.  
Keywords: Retrenchment; Ownership Expropriation; Earnings Management; Corporate 
Governance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management has been a real deal for stakeholder due to good corporate 
governance. The collapse of Enron and WorldCom is one of the examples of how earnings 
management creates a major problem in the market, and it pushed policy maker to devise new 
policy, such Sarbanes-Oxley act, which requires board to acquire financial sophistication as an 
attempt to eliminate earnings management. NASDAQ also issues a new guideline about financial 
literacy of audit committees for all listed companies due to reduce earnings management. In 
addition, accounting board in every country seeks to modify the accounting standard for the sake 
of elimination of creative accounting.  These are the evidences that earnings management cannot 
be underestimated, and make it as important research.  
Earnings management is occurred because of accrual accounting system.  Accrual 
accounting gives agents (managers) significant rights to determine profit in various periods. In 
fact, agents have meaningful control on the recognition of cost such as R&D cost, fixed asset, 
inventory, and advertisement (Amy, 2005; Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury 2006). Agents have 
also power in recognition of revenue in accrual system such as credit sales or merger and 
acquisition (Yoon and Miller, 2002). In alignment perspective, agents believe that the goal of 
earnings management is investors’ wealth (Yoon and Miller, 2002). Hence, it could be concluded 
that agents have control in operating earnings management due to accrual accounting system. 
In other side, the activities of selling fixed asset, purchasing inventory, paying selling and 
general expense (including advertisement), merger and acquisition, and employee layoff are part 
of firm strategy, known as retrenchment strategy. In the perspective of strategy management, 
retrenchment strategy is a common method for firm in securing potential future cash flow 
(Robbins and Pearce, 1992; David, 2013). For instance, Malaysia Airlines fired their employees 
due to financial distress, or Facebook bought Instagram for expanding the business.  Yet, this 
strategy is not popular in governance research, as many corporate governance papers focus more 
on diversification strategy (Denis et al, 1997; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Denis et al, 2002; Lins 
and Servaes, 2002; Fauver et al, 2004; Chen and Yu, 2012; Lee et al, 2012), or marketing 
strategy (Ghosh and John, 1999; McAlister and Ferrell, 2002; Kurt and Hulland, 2013). 
Therefore, this study aims to fill that gap. 
Earnings management is occurred around the world, and Malaysia is no exception. For 
instance, Malaysia Securities commission reported there were 17 cases of earnings manipulation 
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from 1996 to 2012. PwC reported their survey that 48% of Malaysian companies were the 
victims of white collar crime, and only 25% of them had willingness to strengthen the internal 
audit. Further, the PwC survey revealed that for the two years prior to the survey, the average 
loss from fraud per company in Malaysia was US $173,303.  
Further, the main driving forces behind the retrenchment strategy and earnings 
management may be is the matter of institutional characteristics. Note that highly controlled firm 
has less information openness, and affiliation is able to form close social ties that provide shared 
information, resources and business opportunities among themselves (George and Kabir, 2012, 
Lee et al, 2012). This means that highly concentrated family firms will have higher chance to 
manipulate earnings compared to lower concentrated family firms, or foreign firms are more 
regulatory complied compared to family firms. Agents who came from family firm may act 
following the shareholder needs as they are also member of family. Meanwhile, agents who 
came from foreign firms perhaps comply the regulation by avoiding earnings management 
because professionalism.  
Typically, Malaysia companies belong to family-controlled owners (Claessens et al., 
2002; Tam and Tan, 2007). These family ultimate owners usually participate actively in the 
management's decision making process of the firm without necessarily owning significant 
majority shareholdings in the firm. As a consequence, issue of corporate governance is 
unsurprisingly an alarming concern, in which the agency problem between majority and minority 
shareholders has overshadowed the agency problem between owners and managers which is 
more common in the developing countries. This implies that Malaysia has more tendency of 
earnings management due to the dominance of family-controlled firms.  
Malaysia offers a unique environment for examining the relationship between 
retrenchment and earnings management for numerous reasons. First, the high degree of 
retrenchment among Malaysian firms would act as good platform for further exploration of this 
topic. Especially, there is high correlation between retrenchment and earnings management cases 
in Malaysia. Second, Malaysia provides an interesting setting to examine the relationship 
between retrenchment and earnings management with its emerging and open economy, where 
the capital market is not well monitored and regulated like developed market. Lastly, the 
prevalence of the highly concentrated ownership and control through pyramiding or crossholding 
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might provide us different insight into the literature of this area. Those rationales make this 
research more interesting. 
This study aims to address the following question. Do Malaysia’s listed companies 
consider retrenchment costs when they manipulate earning across its ownership expropriation? 
This study explores the distinction of family owned companies, government owned companies 
and foreign companies so as to provide evidence to the knowledge gap on the retrenchment costs 
that could assist in investigated in earnings management between these three groups. 
This research’s contribution is fourfold. First, this study expands current research areas 
such as performance of corporate strategy. Most research on the association between corporate 
strategy and corporate governance discuss about diversification strategy. It is very rare to found a 
research engages with retrenchment strategy. Second, this research contributes the literature by 
extending the understanding of this research area of a small emerging market such Malaysia. The 
findings of this research may be used as the benchmark for the same research with similar market 
context (less develop market). Third, this research further establishes the fact that ownership 
identity and or structure may play important role in the relationship between retrenchment 
strategy and earnings management. In addition, the contribution is regarding to the 
methodologies that used in the study. This study does not only offer panel approach which more 
robust than pooled regression, but also offers a new method to measure retrenchment strategy.   
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Retrenchment is popular and frequency strategies used in organization all over the world. 
Morrow et.al, (2004) defined retrenchment is the activities that deducted in assets and costs. This 
is consistent with Robbins and Pearce (1992) and David (2013) said that retrenchment occurs 
when an organization regroups through cost and asset reduction to improved sales and profits.  
The retrenchment actions included entail selling off land and buildings to rise needed cash, 
layoff the employees, pruning product lines, closing marginal businesses, closing obsolete 
factories and systems. Moreover, prior research classified the retrenchment into two schemes 
which is asset retrenchment and cost retrenchment (Morrow et al., 2004; Hofer, 1980; Robbins 
and Pearce, 1992). Asset retrenchment refers to the reduction of assets (Robbins and Pearce, 
1992), such as closing plants, divesting equity, reducing stocks of property, plants, 
equipment(PPE), and reduction of inventory (Morrow et al., 2004). Meanwhile, cost 
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retrenchment refers to the reduction of total costs such as miscellaneous costs, selling, general, 
and administrative expenses (SGA) and interest expense (Robbins and Pearce, 1992). In this 
study, we defined retrenchment as reduction of the finished goods and inventory, the reduction of 
the number of employees, the reduction of SGA, the reduction of PPE, and the reduction of 
research and developing costs (R&D). 
Earnings management is not only primary area of accounting research, but also an 
important concern of corporate stakeholders. Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) defined earnings 
management as an activity that occurred when managers adjusted the value financial reporting 
and alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. Managers may participate in earnings management by convey or adjusted 
the information about the firm’s future and latest performance to the insiders in the form of 
financial reporting (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Healy and Palepu, 1993; Leuz et al., 2003).  
One of the ways to employ earnings management is through the retrenchment costs. 
Beauregard (1991) mentioned that managers generally focused on control because the purpose 
was to strive for a rigorous and scientific command of technology, product quality, sales 
networks and financial management. Therefore, enterprise managers may ask to retrench activity 
or excess staff responded in a variety of ways to improve the financial performance. The prior 
literature also suggests that managers will choose earnings management method to recover a 
business’s poor performance. (Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2006). Moreover, Richardson et al. 
(2003) also found that the working capital (account receivable, inventory, and account payable) 
and non-current assets (property plant and equipment, intangibles, differing tax and post-
retirement liabilities) were statistically significant for the accounting manipulation technique. In 
addition, Damak and Halioui (2013) indicated that the managers also try accounting treatment of 
R&D expenditures in order to smooth earnings.  Arya et al. (2003) argue that the way to improve 
the overall quality of earnings information is by smoothing earnings. In simply, managers 
remove the transient portion of earnings and communicate the sustainable portion, thereby 
enabling investors to form an efficient estimate of firm performance. 
Several prior research describes the emerging logic has been that retrenchment strategic 
is positively related to firm performance (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; O’Neill, 1986; Schendel 
et al., 1976). However, research investigating whether companies might manipulate their 
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earnings through the retrenchment costs across ownership expropriation is limited. Therefore, 
this study aims to investigate whether Malaysia listed companies use retrenchment costs to 
manipulate earning across its ownership expropriation. Most of the previous researcher has 
indicated there is a positively statically significant relationship between retrenchment and firm 
performance. In surmise, the retrenchment will be positively statically significant relationship on 
earnings management as the reverse the declining financial statement and performance. 
Considering all the factors and issues, this research hypothesizes three important 
statements. First, we suggest that there is a significant relationship between the retrenchment and 
earnings management. When firms face declining financial performance, retrenchment costs may 
influence the manager by using the income smoothing technique can to improved performance 
especially among poorly performing firms. In other word, there is a statically significant 
relationship between earnings management and retrenchment. A number of recent studies focus 
on the relationship between earnings management and certain factors, such as firm size, return on 
assets, firm’s natural, leverage ratio, and other control variables that are significant to the 
earnings management (Donghua at.et, 2011; ; Lei and Liu 2006; Bartov et al., 2000; Dechow et 
al., 1995, 1996;Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) 
The second hypothesis is that the relationship between the retrenchment and earnings 
management across its ownership expropriation. This supports previous research highlights a 
number of consequences of founding ownership expropriation (Pornsit et al., 2009; Anderson et 
al., 2003; Jung and Kwon, 2002). According to Fan and Wong (2002), the larger the insider 
ownership of controlling, the stronger the motivation of controlling to expropriate minority 
interest will directly make the higher the degree of earnings management. In short, the larger of 
the ultimate ownership of the firm will affect the mind of the controlling of the earnings 
management. 
Lastly, this research hypothesizes that ownership identity has a significant impact on the 
relationship between the retrenchment and earnings management across different ownership 
identify. In this study, we classified ownership identity into family, foreign and government 
controlled firm. Pornsit et al. (2009) said that non-family firms are likely to manage earnings 
than family firms. Earnings management is perceived a better performance to investors 
especially for family owned companies (Fan and Wong, 2002). Moreover, prior research 
findings support the notion that family control can reduce earnings management (Wang, 2006).  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This study examines the companies, which listed on the Bursa Malaysia for the period 2008-
2013. The relationship between retrenchment and the earnings management of the companies 
across it ownership expropriation is investigated. Beneish m-score is used as a proxy to detect 
earnings management and short candidates (Beneish, 1999).  Besides that, control variable, 
including firm’s size, firm’s profitability, growth opportunity, and leverage are estimated by 
using a regression model to control the effect on the earnings management. Retrenchment costs 
as the main focus independent variable in this study.  
 
3.1. Earnings Management as Dependent Variable 
The magnitude of earnings management (EM) is an important issue to be explained in this study. 
The Beneish M-score model denotes the probability of manipulation from Beneish (1999) score 
to detect earnings management and short candidates. In this study, five financial ratios Beneish 
equation is used to detect whether a company has managed its earnings. Once calculated, the five 
variables are combined together to achieve an M-score for the company. An M-Score greater 
than -2.22 indicates a high probability of earnings manipulation which the company is likely to 
be manipulator. An M-Score of less than -2.22 indicates that the company will not be a 
manipulator. The beneish m-score model is described as below: 
M-score = -6.065 + 0.823 DSRI + 0.906 GMI + 0.593 AQI + 0.717 SGI + 0.107 DEPI   
Noted that the Days’ Sales in Receivables Index, DSRI is the ratio of days’ sales in receivables 
in year t to year t-1. A large increase in Days’ Sales in Receivables Index could be indicative of 
revenue inflation. GMI is the Gross Margin Index is the ratio of gross margin versus the prior 
year.  Generally, a firm with poorer prospects is more likely to manipulate their firm earnings. 
AQI is the Asset Quality Index, which measures the ratio of non-current assets other than plant, 
property and equipment to total assets. Meanwhile, SGI is the Sales Growth Index, which 
measures the ratio of sales in year t to sales. Lastly, DEPI is the Depreciation Index, which 
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measures the ratio of the rate of depreciation in the prior year to the corresponding rate. In 
surmise, the five financial ratio can formulated in the equation as shown in Table 1: 
 
Table 1 
Beneish M-score financial ratio’s formula    
This table shows the Beneish M-score’s five financial ratio in equation form. DSRI is Days’ Sales in Receivables 
Index; GMI is Gross Margin Index; AQI is Asset Quality Index; SGI is Sales Growth Index; DEPI is Depreciation 
Index. M = -6.065 + 0.823 DSRI + 0.906 GMI + 0.593 AQI + 0.717 SGI + 0.107 DEPI   
M-score financial ratio Formula 
Days Receivable Index (DSRI)  DSRI = (Net Receivablest / Salest) / Net Receivablest-1 / Salest-1) 
Gross Margin Index (GMI)              GMI = [(Salest-1 - COGSt-1) / Salest-1] / [(Salest - COGSt) / Salest]  
Asset Quality Index (AQI)                AQI = [(Total Assetst - Current Assetst - PPEt )/Total Assetst] / [(Total 
Assetst-1-Current Assetst-1 -PPEt-1 ) / Total Assetst-1)] 
Sales Growth Index (SGI)                 SGI = Salest / Salest-1 
Depreciation Index (DEPI)                   DEPI = [Depreciationt-1/ (PPEt-1 + Depreciationt-1)] / [Depreciationt / (PPEt 
+ Depreciationt)] 
 
3.2 Control Variables 
A number of recent studies focus on the relationship between earnings management and certain 
factors, such as firm size, return on assets, firm’s natural, leverage ratio, and other control 
variables that are significant to the earnings management (Donghua at.et, 2011; Lei and Liu 2006; 
Bartov et al., 2000; Dechow et al., 1995, 1996;Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). In this study, size, 
profitability, growth opportunity, and leverage are incorporated as control variables. Firm size 
can be measured by using the log of assets (LTA). Meanwhile, a growth opportunity was 
measured by the capital expenditure-sales ratio (CES). The profitability was measured by the 
ratio of operating income-sales (OIS), and leverage (LEV) was measured by using the ratio of 
debt to common share equity. Hence, the empirical regression model is as follows: 
)1(..................................................,,4,3,2,10, titititititi LEVCESOISLTAEM    
 
3.3 Retrenchment as Independent Variable 
In this research, retrenchment defined as reduction in assets and costs especially in action of the 
reduction of the finished goods and inventory, the reduction of the number of employees, the 
reduction of SGA, the reduction of PPE, and the reduction of R&D costs (David, 2013; Morrow 
et al., 2004; Hofer, 1980; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). We find the data through annual report and 
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related website especially the number of the employees. The annual reports were downloaded 
from the website of Bursa Malaysia. The retrenchment is part of earnings management; hence, 
we could 
obtain data pertaining to it from the income statement. Otherwise, we could find the data from 
the notes of the financial statements that explain the company’s revenue.  
)2....(..............................,,5,4,3,2,10, tititititititi RETLEVCESOISLTAEM    
 
3.4 Ownership Structure as moderate variable  
 This study presented ultimate ownership (UO) to represent ownership expropriation to 
align with the second hypothesis is that the relationship between the retrenchment and earnings 
management across its ownership expropriation. This supports previous research highlights a 
number of consequences of founding ownership expropriation (Pornsit et al., 2009; Anderson et 
al., 2003; Jung and Kwon, 2002). In addition, we also investigate the square of the ultimate 
ownership (UO2) where the relationship between ultimate ownership and earnings management 
is nonlinear can determined (Morck et al., 1988; Davies et al., 2005).The two variables are added 
to the model. 
)3.......(2 ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,10, tititititititititi UOUORETLEVCESOISLTAEM    
 To further investigate on the ownership identify. We added the interactive term into 
Model (3) according to each type of firm identity, namely, family owned and government owned. 
We consider foreign firms as benchmark in this research. 
)4...(..............................................................................................................*
*2
,,9
,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,10,
titi
tititititititititi
RETGOV
RETDFAMUOUORETLEVCESOISLTAEM




  
3.4 Data 
The sample used in this study covered 237 publicly listed firms on the Malaysian stock exchange 
in Malaysia between 2003 and 2013.  Previously, the sample consisted of 714 firms-years over 
the period of 6 years with complete data. However, we exclude firms that have insufficient data 
throughout the six-year period from 2008 until 2013. 
The data used in this research were retrieved from World scope database to collect the 
panel set of annual financial data from 2008 to 2013. Mostly financial data can be retrieved to 
measure the variables that needed. However, the insufficient data for retrenchment and ultimate 
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ownership data can only were retrieved from the annual reports of the sample companies and 
website. Earnings management data involved the value of revenue, cost of goods sold, and total 
fixed assets, total assets, total depreciation and net receivable. Meanwhile, retrenchment data 
needed the value of finished goods and inventory, the number of employees, the value of SGA, 
the value of PPE, and the value of R&D costs. Lastly, the ultimate ownership is determined 
through the list of substantial shareholders and continues classified the companies in order to 
identify the ultimate owner into family, government and foreign. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between retrenchment and the value of the firm 
across it ownership expropriation. This study was covered 237 publicly listed companies on the 
Malaysian stock exchange in Malaysia between 2003 and 2013 by using the Beneish M-score as 
measurement for earnings management. This section reports the empirical research results of the 
study and discusses the significance of the research results. 
 
4.1 Summary of descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations matrix of this study’s variables 
companies across the six-year period (2008–2013). The mean values were determined for seven 
variables of this study. On another side of the table, we determined the Satterthwaite–Welch's t 
tests for differences in the mean value for each variable. From the table, we found that Beneish 
are all strong negatively correlated with all the variable. Therefore, these result presents that the 
there is a statically significant relationship between retrenchment and earnings management. 
Table 2 
Summary of descriptive statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics for our sample of 1602 firm-years between 2008 and 2013. For the mean 
value, value in the parenthesis are standard deviation; for SW t test is refers to Satterthwaite–Welch's t test and the 
value the parenthesis under SWt test are p-values. 
Variable Code Mean 
SW-t test 
Beneish LTA OIS CES LEV RET 
Beneish M-score Beneish 
-2.590            
(12.099)            
log of assets LTA 
5.467 -8.057          
(0.532) (0.413)***          
Operating income-
sales ratio 
OIS 
-0.062 -2.528 5.529        
(1.583) (0.417)*** (0.057)***        
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4.2 Preliminary estimates for earnings management 
We report the baseline panel regression results in Table 3. The control variables that used in this 
study are firm size, firm profitability, growth opportunity, and leverage. The coefficients of 
variable are all positive. There is only a significant positive relationship between CEV and 
Beneish at 1% level. A unit increase in CEV leads to a 0.566 unit change in Beneish m-score. 
Based on the results obtained from the OLS estimation, the adjusted R-squared value of the 
estimated linear-linear regression model is 0.009. As a result, the earnings management is 
affected by firm growth. This is consistent with Nagy and Neal (2001) who stated that earnings 
management is influenced by the growth of the firm.  
 Table 3 
Panel regression estimates of earnings management 
The value reported is the coefficient value, with standard error in the parenthesis. This study is using four control 
variables for the baseline regression to affect earnings management of firm where LTA is the log of assets (firm 
size); CES is the capital expenditure-sales ratio (growth opportunities); OIS is the ratio of operating income-sales 
ratio (profitability) and LEV is the ratio of debt to common share equity (leverage). *, **, *** Denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The model is as follows: 
titititititi LEVCESOISLTAEM ,,4,3,2,10,    
 
Model (1) 
CONSTANT 
-4.299 
(4.256) 
LTA 
0.256 
(0.788) 
OIS 
0.566 
(0.408) 
CES 
3.649 
(1.196)*** 
LEV 
0.041 
(0.184) 
R2 0.014 
Adj R2 0.009 
 
4.3 Preliminary estimates for earnings management with retrenchment strategy 
capital expenditure-
sales ratio 
CES 
0.088 -2.679 5.379 -0.150      
(0.539) (0.413)*** (0.026)*** (0.057)***      
Debt-common share 
equity ratio 
LEV 
0.604 -3.194 4.863 -0.666 -0.515    
(2.253) (0.420)*** (0.079)*** (0.094)*** (0.079)***    
Retrenchment RET 
-0.308 -2.282 5.775 0.246 0.396 0.912  
(0.401) (0.413)*** (0.023)*** (0.056)*** (0.023)*** (0.078)***  
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Table 4 shows the panel regression results of Model (2). The adjusted R-squared value of the 
estimated linear-linear regression model is 0.009. We found that the results of Table 4 is 
consistent with Table 3 , where the size (LTA), profitability (OIS) and leverage (LEV) still do 
not have any significant impact on earnings management, whilst the growth opportunities 
statistically contribute to earnings management. Meanwhile, the retrenchment denotes the 
negatively statistical significance on beneish m-score at 5% level where the coefficient is 2.067. 
In short, retrenchment might contribute to induce firm’s earnings management. Note that 
Beneish M-Score stated that if the value is lower than -2.2, there is an indication of earnings 
manipulation. Hence, our findings documented a negative sign between retrenchment and 
Beneish M-Score. This means that the higher the retrenchment, the lower the value of Beneish 
M-Score. In other words, the higher the retrenchment, the higher is earnings management 
possibility.  Therefore, agents (managers) might adjust the information about the firm’s future 
and latest performance using the activity of retrenchment. This is consistent to previous research 
such Hsien and Hsien (2004), Morrow et al (2004), and David (2013). 
Table 4 
Panel regression estimates of earnings management with retrenchment strategy 
The value reported is the coefficient value, with standard error in the parenthesis. This study is using four control 
variables for the baseline regression to affect earnings management of firm where LTA is the log of assets (firm 
size); CES is the capital expenditure-sales ratio (growth opportunities); OIS is the ratio of operating income-sales 
ratio (profitability); LEV is the ratio of debt to common share equity (leverage) and RET is the retrenchment 
strategy that we mainly focus in this study which is defined as reduction in assets and costs especially in action of 
the reduction of the finished goods and inventory, the reduction of the number of employees, the reduction of SGA, 
the reduction of PPE, and the reduction of R&D costs. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. The model is as follows: 
tititititititi RETLEVCESOISLTAEM ,,5,4,3,2,10,    
 
Model (2) 
CONSTANT 
-6.403 
(4.384) 
LTA 
0.532 
(0.788) 
OIS 
0.561 
(0.408) 
CES 
3.403 
(1.201)*** 
LEV 
0.001 
(0.185) 
RET 
-2.067 
(0.905)** 
R2 0.018 
Adj R2 0.012 
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4.4 Further estimates for earnings management with ownership expropriation  
Table 5 presents the estimates of beneish m-score of listed firms across ownership expropriation. 
All the findings show that the results are consistent with the estimates in Table 4. There is no 
significant relationship on the size (LTA), profitability (OIS) and leverage (LEV) on Beneish. 
Growth opportunities (CES) still denotes the positively and statistical significance to Beneish m-
score meanwhile retrenchment (RET) denotes the negatively and statistical significance to 
beneish m-score.  
From the sample analysed, ultimate ownership does not play significant role with the 
practice of earnings management. This result was different with previous research that highlights 
a number of consequences of founding ownership expropriation (Pornsit et al., 2009; Anderson 
et al., 2003; Jung and Kwon, 2002). Some possible explanations for this result are Malaysian 
managers or directors normally use retrenchment strategy—by reducing the costs and assets—in 
order to remain competitive and sustain their profitability during financial downturn, but not to 
adjust the earnings. In general, retrenchment strategy enables companies to survive through the 
rising tide during economic crisis. 
Table 5 
Panel regression estimates of earnings management with retrenchment strategy and ultimate ownership 
The value reported is the coefficient value, with standard error in the parenthesis. The panel regression continues 
performed the result after added the ultimate ownership. The regression involved with variables where LTA, CES, 
OIS, LEV as control variables; RET as dependent variable; and Ultimate Ownership (UO) as moderate variables. *, 
**, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
tititititititititi UOUORETLEVCESOISLTAEM ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,10, 2      
 
Model (3) 
CONSTANT 
-6.028 
(4.803) 
LTA 
0.650 
(0.817) 
OIS 
0.562 
(0.408) 
CES 
3.300 
(1.203)*** 
LEV 
-0.008 
(0.185) 
RET 
-2.082 
(1.061)* 
UO 
-0.041 
(0.101) 
UO2 0.000 
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(0.001) 
R2 0.019 
Adj R2 0.011 
In addition to CG mechanisms, corporate ownership structures of a family owned 
companies and government owned companies are also incorporated into the study’s model 
equation. This is because Fama and Jensen, 1983, have stated that the presence of the founding 
family with strong equity position and their ability to have control over the management, present 
an advantage for the family to monitor the business. Additionally, founding family firms have 
less incentive to manage their company earnings as they face less pressure to meet or beat 
earnings expectation (Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2009). However, when regression is done on the 
distinction of corporate ownership structures of family firms and non-family firms, different CG 
mechanisms were found to be effective to control for the EM activities in those respective 
corporate ownership structures. (Mansor et al.2013). Therefore, it is very important to investigate 
whether the retrenchment costs will affect the earnings management across the ownership 
structure. However, our result finds that the regression shown retrenchment has no statically 
significant or effective in ownership structure. Table 6 presents that there is no significant effect 
on interactive variable and earnings management. The CES still denotes a positively and 
statistically significant with a coefficient value of 3.766 with earnings management. The OIS 
denotes a positively and statistically significant with a coefficient value of 0.687 with earnings 
management after adding the interactive dummy variable.  In a nutshell, there is no significant 
relationship between the earnings management and retrenchment across the ownership structure. 
Both family owned companies and government owned companies is not significant. 
 
Table 6 
Panel regression estimates of earnings management with retrenchment strategy and ownership structure 
The value reported is the coefficient value, with standard error in the parenthesis. The regression is further 
investigate on the ownership identify. By adding the interactive term into Model (3) according to each type of firm 
identity, namely, family owned and government owned. We consider government owned firms as benchmark for the 
regression,*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The model 4 
follows as
tititititititititititi RETDGOVRETDFAMUOUORETLEVCESOISLTAEM ,,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,10, **2  
 
 
Model (4) 
CONSTANT 
-6.981 
(4.846) 
LTA 
0.788 
(0.825) 
OIS 
0.687 
(0.414)* 
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CES 
3.766 
(1.222)*** 
LEV 
-0.024 
(0.186) 
RET 
-3.038 
(1.206) 
UO 
-0.041 
(0.101) 
UO2 
0.000 
(0.001) 
DFAM*RET 
-3.59 
(2.301) 
DGOV*RET 
-0.846 
(4.85) 
R2 0.022 
Adj R2 0.012 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Using a sample of listed companies between 2003 and 2013, we conduct an empirical study of 
the retrenchment activity for earnings management across ownership expropriation in the context 
of Malaysia. The results show earnings management will affected by the growth opportunities 
which is consistent with Nagy and Neal (2001) mentioned that smoothing behavior may also 
affected by the pressure to signal growth. Moreover, the motivation to conduct earnings 
management will greater when earnings are lower. Our results shows that there is a negatively 
relationship between earnings management and retrenchment. In other word, managers or related 
parties that participate in earnings management will reduced the chance of adjusted the 
information about the firm’s future and latest performance until the firm performance is under 
control or stable (Hsien and Hsien, 2004). In addition, retrenchment activity not only to save 
companies that faced bad financial performance also a necessary part of securing the future and 
maximize the profit for the growth companies become a important variable that effect the 
earnings management. However, there is no significant relationship between the earnings 
management and retrenchment across the ownership expropriation.  Our first contribution to the 
earnings management literature is that retrenchment, research investigating whether companies 
might manipulate their earnings through the retrenchment costs across ownership expropriation 
is limited. There are a number of limitations to this study. First, we created new variables as 
16 
 
proxies for retrenchment that have limited used in previous studies. Second, there is a data 
limitation for retrenchment. Nonetheless, these limitations all provide directions for future 
research. 
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